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"Legal experts are always under the decisionist pressure to discuss
normative questions with cases to be decided." - Jurgen Habermas'

I. INTRODUCTION
Fortunately, anthropologists do not face too many such decisionist
constraints. So to be really serious, what truly democratic and innovative
transitions could be enacted in North and South American nation-states for
the benefits of indigenous groups which remain not only poor, not only
politically and economically marginal, but also culturally outcast no matter
how "postmodern" some of them have become and yet rightly refuse to be
so considered.2

* Concordia University, Montrdal.
1. Jirgen Habermas, Strugglesfor Recognition in the DemocraticConstitutionalState, in
CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Amy

Gutman ed., 1994).
2. Cf Dominique Legros, First Nation Postmodern Cultures: (Re)Constructing the
(De)Constructedand Celebratingthe Changes, in MIRROR WRITING: (DE)CONSTRUCTION OF
NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY 125-54 (Thomas Claviez & Maria Moss eds., 2000).
579
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The answer is as obvious as it is difficult to implement: State laws and
legal apparatuses should be reformed to allow indigenous people to
perpetuate, reproduce and freely let flourish and evolve their various
distinct languages, cultures and contemporary definitions of the good life.
The aim of this Essay is to illustrate what this could entail within the
limits of the question of the distinctiveness of culture. To achieve this, I
take one example only: that of the Tutchone Indians of the central Yukon

Territory in Canada with whom I have worked since 1972.3 This Essay
indicates in which way Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer's democratic
liberalism 2 could partially accommodate the reproduction of indigenous
cultures within the Canadian federal nation-state. 4 However, I also use
other examples from the Tutchone traditions to illustrate how some key
cultural traits which involve questions of divergent morality would not be
readily accepted by liberalism 2. Thus, in this respect even liberalism 2 is
presented as remaining a fetter for world cultural democracy. Finally,
taking into account the culturally defined morality of liberal democracies,
I indicate in which way human rights, which are presented as the bedrock
of any democracy, are not culturally neutral and rest, in fact, on a univocal
definition of the good life, which, in turn, leads to ethnocentrism.

II. THE LIFEWORLD AND GOOD LIFE OF AN INDIGENOUS NATION
Today, the Tutchone nations live in three villages scattered in an area
as big as half of England stricto sensu. They count about one thousand
inhabitants. Very few Euro-Canadians are settled among them.
To be brief, I leave aside the few ethnonihilist Tutchone who reject
their own culture, and I focus on something as elementary as the
maintenance and reproduction of their traditional family laws. Can this
part of their culture be protected and fostered within a federal state such

as Canada?
To begin, the key feature of the Tutchone social world is that the entire
population is divided into two exogamous clans: the wolves and the

3. At this late stage in my ethnographic career, I talk about the Tutchone first people from
the vantage point of Horizont Verschmelzung - Hans Gadamer's concept that translates as "fusion
of horizons." This stage is reached when everyone explicitly discusses his/her horizon during an
encounter. I bring a horizon conditioned by things like the travail of getting to understand their
horizon, and them by the travail of grasping the terms of mine, and by the reciprocal anxieties of
yesterday, before horizons could be fused. Cf HANs G. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1960).
4. Liberalism 2 as opposed to the high minded moral absolutism ofprocedural liberalism 1.
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crows.5 Members of the same clan cannot marry each other, even if they

prove that they are not genealogically related in any degree (this is a case
of strict clan exogamy). Members of a given clan must marry someone

from the other clan, and ideally, if possible, a close cousin belonging to the
opposed clan.'
The rule of strict clan exogamy is essential to the system.' However, it
has always been and still is hard to enforce in the case of individuals who
are not genealogically related. Perhaps because it was always so, a century
ago, individuals who were discovered to have broken the rule, were
sentenced to death. Their respective maternal uncle executed them (one
case known with a full description of the execution). As a result of clan
exogamy, each camp and each household includes members of the crow

and wolf clans (at least husband and wife).

-

Moreover, descent is strictly matrilineal. Children belong exclusively
to their mother's clan - and in no way to that of their father's. Adult
males have and exercise final authority only over their sister's children
never over their own children with whom, as fathers, they have a relation
not unlike the lighter one we have, in North-Atlantic and Latin cultures
(N.A.L.C.) with our own nephews and nieces. Within Tutchone culture,
there was and there still is no policing across generations above the
relations between maternal uncles and nephews and nieces. As mothers'
brothers are present or called upon only for important occasions, this gives
women a considerable autonomy in their daily lives within their conjugal

family and with their husbands.!
When a woman, young or old, does not want to remain a widow but
can find no one to remarry, her husband's brother has the duty to take her
as a wife and to support her. This is somewhat similar to the Biblical
custom known as the levirate (Genesis 38:8; Deuteronomy 25:5-10) which
is still honored by a few orthodox Jews. When a widower wishes to be
5. When a population is divided into only two such clans, the anthropological technical term
for these two clans is two moieties (from the French moitid, meaning half). To keep the text as
jargon free as possible I use "clan," just as contemporary Tutchone do.
6. Such as a mother's brother's daughter or a father's sister's daughter. This is technically
known as a bilateral cross-cousin marriage system, this institution is very common in indigenous
cultures in many parts of the world, as well as in some modem nation-states like India (in the
southern part where it takes a matrilateral form) and where it is perfectly legal.
7. In 1973, George Billy from the Little Salmon band, one of my main collaborators,
commented on the importance of the exogamy rule as follows: "If you let them break it, it's gonna
spoil the whole world - I mean the whole people. That's why we had to kill those who broke it."
By "whole world," he was clearly referring to the societal structure.
8. In N.A.L. cultures where divorced parents and single mothers are becoming more
common, such a structure of brother/sister rights and duties could have advantages to keep a role
for males in the societal reproduction cycle . .. But let us leave that open for another debate.
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remarried but cannot find a woman, his wife's sister has the duty to take
him as a new and eventually as a second husband. In this case, there is no
Biblical equivalent. These arrangements insure emotional and economic
support as well as sexual gratification between members of opposed clans
and, by the same token, between family members ...
Obviously, when the husband's brother or the wife's sister is already
married, this leads to polygamy - to polygyny in the case of a man
inheriting a widowed sister of his current wife (in the early 1970s I was
thus the guest of a man who was living with his wife and her older sister
who had earlier become a widow); to polyandry in the case of a woman
inheriting the brother of her present husband. Other forms of polygamy are
also culturally perfectly legitimate. A man may be married to several
women at the same time, even several sisters (polygyny and sororal
polygyny in the latter case). Also, a woman may be married to several men
at the same time, even brothers (polyandry and fraternal polyandry in the
second case). During my fieldwork, one polyandrous marriage existed. It
is worth mentioning how it was initiated for it demonstrates that some
plural unions were the results of individual choices rather than the
outcomes of simple socioeconomic imperatives. The story was volunteered
in 1991 by a polyandrous woman, who was then around 85 years old, and
widowed from her oldest husband. For the story her name will be Mary
and the real Mary will remain anonymous as well as her husbands for
whom I also use pseudonyms. 9
I am crow clan. I was twenty and married to Albert (wolf clan) who
was about 35. Johnny, Albert's sister's son, was living with us.
Johnny was wolf clan like my husband. He was then about 17. One
winter when Johnny and I were coming back to camp with
firewood, we made love on the loaded sleigh. I liked it so much that
we kept doing it like that for quite a while. But Albert caught us and
scolded us. He asked that we stop. Me and Johnny tried for a while.
But a few months later we were back in business. You know ... I
loved it so much with him ... ! Albert found out again and asked
us to stop again. We told him we could not help it. He said: if it is
going to be that way, then the three of us will get married. And,
that's how it all started. After that we just lived in the same tent.

9. It is interesting to note that I have to protect the identity of those involved in this legal
form of marriage which is not approved of in our culture. Notice too how you probably agree with
my decision. Why? When another people's custom contradicts ours, it is better for the people in
question if we do not tell who practices what we do not like. But, that it should not be so is the very
topic of this Essay about Horizont Verschmelzung.
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Not to make my two men jealous, I hanged a blanket between their

beds.'0
Churches' admonitions and the federal state's criminal code have since
then led other such marriages to hide underground ... But on the main,
most everyone still openly respects the rule of clan exogamy.
At this juncture, let us highlight the following: (1) Tutchone Indians
have had their marriage system for at least three thousand years, (2)
matriliny was already one of their cultural traits when their ancestors
moved from Siberia to Alaska about nine thousand years ago," and (3)
numerous populations across the world have had similar kinship and
marriage systems.12
Now, I turn to my main query: may a liberal state be democratic
enough to enact legal measures which would ensure at last the
reproduction and the flourishing continuation of such a lifeworld of clan
exogamy, matrilineal descent, and plural marriage?

III. LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

We must start by recognizing the existence of different forms of
liberalism. Commenting on Charles Taylor's work, Michael Walzer
suggests contrasting what amounts to two Weberian ideal types: liberalism
1 and liberalism 2. These two forms of liberalism cope with cultural

variations in very different ways.
(Liberalism 1) is committed in the strongest possible way to
individual rights and, almost as a deduction from this, to a
rigorously neutral state - that is to a state without cultural
commitment or religious projects or, indeed, any sort of collective
goals beyond the personal freedom and the physical security,
welfare, and safety of its citizens ...
(Liberalism 2) allows for a state committed to the survival and
flourishing of a particular nation, culture, or religion, or of a
(limited) set of nations, cultures, and religions - so long as the
10. Dominique Legros, Field Notes from Pelly Crossing, Yukon, Summer 1991 (on file with
author).

11.

Cf ISIDORE DYEN & DAVID F. ABERLE, LEXICAL RECONSTRUCTION: THE CASE OF THE

M.E. Krauss & Victor K. Golla, Northern
Athapaskan Languages, in 6 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 67-85 (W.C. Sturtevant
ed., 1981).
12. CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, LES STRUCTURES ELEMENTAIRES DE LA PARENTE (Paris-LaHaye:
Mouton 1967) (1949).
PROTO-ATHAPASKAN KINSHIP SYSTEM (1974);
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basic rights of citizens who have different commitments or no such
commitments at all are protected.13
With regard to liberalism 2,14 it should be added that minority cultural
rights to be granted under its name would first have to be appraised
through an evaluation of the worth of the minority lifeworlds or cultures."5
States comprising several nations need to be further distinguished.
Following Jurgen Habermas' 6 and Michael Walzer," one may speak of
two poles. The first one is that of the European multinational state with
long-established territorial nations and/or territorial nationalities. Many
contemporary states in Asia or Africa which are mentioned neither by
Habermas nor Walzer, obviously belong to this landscape too. The second
pole is the migrant multinational state model - countries belonging to this
group have stemmed from the massive intercontinental population
movements that took place in the last few centuries. Among them are
Brazil, Argentina, Columbia, Australia, the United States, and Canada.
These more recent states are dominated by the descendants of migrant
populations and they differ from the European multinational type mainly
in that their various migrant groups have not reconstituted localized
nations or nationalities. A migrant state is more like a nation of dispersed
nationalities, or in John Rawls' parlance, "a social union of social

unions."
Such portrayal of the typical migrant multinational state is, however,
incomplete in one fundamental respect. It masks that its indigenous
populations (who have been "parked" within reserves inside their former
territories)'9 were not, and still are not, migrants, but long-established
culturally homogenous and territorialized nationalities.
In Canada, this is so true, that indigenous first nations are the only
people to be settled in every corner of the federation. They live in the
South (East, West, and Center), and all over the Subarctic and the Artic.
13. Michael Walzer, Comment,

in MULTICULTURALISM:

EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF

RECOGNITION, supranote 1, at 99.

14. However, it should be noted that Habermas differs from Taylor and Walzer in that he
believes that liberalism 1 already incorporates the greater flexibility attributed to liberalism 2. For
Habermas, social movements and struggles ensure the changes that Taylor and Walzer think
possible only under a liberalism of the second type. Habermas, Struggles for Recognition, in
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMIINNG THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION, supra note 1, at 113, 128-34.
15. See Charles Taylor, The PoliticsofRecognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION, supra note 1, at 70-73.
16. Id. at 117-19.
17. Id. at 101.
18. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
19. Very explicitly to make room for migrants from overseas.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss3/5

6

2004]

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' SELF-DETERMINA TION AND THE BROKEN TIN KETTLE MUSIC

Legros: Indigenous Peoples' Self-Determination and the Broken Tin Kettle

585

They have been in these areas since time immemorial (the dates vary from
geographical area to area but, according to the most conservative
estimates, some are as old as nine thousand years or more and none is less
than one thousand years old). No other nationalities in Canada can claim
either that widespread geographical distribution or that historical depth.
This is equally true in the United States, Central and South America, and
in Australia.
As such, Canadian first nations clearly fall under Habermas's category
of endogenous territorial minorities which "see themselves as ethnically
and linguistically homogenous" and distinct20 - much like longestablished minority nationalities in the European nation-state model.
However, in contradistinction to such European national minorities,
Canadian indigenous first nations have to live within and compose with a
federal state dominated by two dispersed majority of Francophone
migrants and Anglophone migrants supported by new migrant dispersed
minorities all arising through more recent transcontinental population
movements (Ukrainians, Italians, Greeks, Haitians, Jamaicans, Pakistanis,
East-Indians, Chinese, French, North Africans, Arabs, etc.).
From the European model standpoint and in the context of several U.N.
declarations and conventions regarding the right to self-determination,
some indigenous people living outside of Canada are groups with a
reason/impetus for political action, and where numbers warrant it, to
eventual independence. Were it not for the "liberal democracy" of the
migrant multinational state within which they have to live, people like the
Navaho in the United States with a population well over 150,000 members
could very well claim their right to independence. This also holds true for
some large first nations in South America, especially in the Andes. Their
numbers compare quite favorably with the 33,000 inhabitants of
Liechtenstein, the 32,000 in Monaco, or the 67,000 in Andorra).2 1
However, in Canada, first nations are much too small - a handful
counts 20,000 members; many are well under this number; and most have
less than 1,000 inhabitants.22 Objectively, such nations have little choice
but to remain under the umbrella of the existing Canadian federal migrant
state. The only remaining crucial question is: with what status? Thus, the
20. See Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE
supra note 1, at 118 (citing Jurgen Habermas).
21. All tax-shelter microstates which remain independent for reasons not as morally valid as
everyone knows as those that indigenous people could put forward.
22. The total registered Indian population is 705,000 (in fact probably 30% more if it was
counted according to Indian customs) and is divided into 614 politically autonomous bands.
However, it must be noted that the federal government has always pushed for the greatest division
possible. Some bands could easily be regrouped as representing a single nation.
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION,
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problem of a transition to a multinational state democracy true to its
endogenous localized first nation cultures - the theme of this Essay - is
acute and will remain so.

IV. THE LIMITS OF PROGRESSIVE LIBERALISM 2

Canada's most original contribution to world political philosophy is an
oxymoron: progressive-conservatism. For decades, this was the name and
the philosophy of one of its two main federal political parties. Its position
was somewhere between liberalism 1 and 2, but closer to 1. The
philosophy of the other dominant party - the Liberal Party - is just a
variant of progressive conservativism. Let us call it "conservativeprogressivism." Its position is somewhere between liberalism 1 and 2, but
closer to 2.
Today, as far as registered Tutchone Indians are concerned, liberalism
2 politicians could probably recognize, but reluctantly, some of the
Tutchone's cultural distinctiveness in family laws. To start with, they
might accept that all Tutchone marriages between opposed clan members
(even between first degree cousins) become legitimate ones (the state
already accepts the Catholic Church exemptions for similar marriages).
Furthermore, it could still accept (but with more reticence), that any
Tutchone marriage between members of the same clan is ipso facto
invalid. As Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, puts it, there would be
good reasons for such legal changes at the local level:
[I]t is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have provided the
horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse
characters and temperaments, over a long period of time - that
have in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy,
the admirable - are almost certain to have something that deserves
our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that
we have to abhor and reject.2 3
However, the present Canadian migrant state would most likely refuse
death sentences or imprisonments for breach of Tutchone clan exogamy
laws. It already rejects the death penalty for any crime, even the most
heinous! However, to respect and support the reproduction of Tutchone
culture and key points in its family laws, it would still have to accept some
form of sanction for breach of Tutchone fundamental law. In that case, it
23. See Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE
supra note 1, at 72-73.

POLITICS OF RECOGNITION,
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could perhaps allow first nation governments to sever all links (rights and
duties) with members not respecting Indian laws.
I would like now to consider a seemingly benign detail of
contemporary Tutchone family life: children's report cards. What do report
cards have to do with family law? Today, all Tutchone children attend
primary school where they are taught by Euro-Canadian teachers (and by
Tutchone elders only for Tutchone language). Their report cards are sent
to their mothers and fathers. To follow Tutchone matrilineal culture they
should instead be sent only to their mothers and to their mothers' brothers.
The mother's role is mainly to support her children. Her brothers' role
(real brothers or clan brothers) is to impose and enforce some discipline.
In the past, the maternal uncle's control of his nephew's physically
demanding puberty ritual confirmed this and inscribed it, in a Foucaldian
sense, in the very flesh, body and mind of his sister's male children.
Among the Tutchone and in similar matrilineal cultures, the father cannot
play the role a father has in N.A.L. cultures. Instead, he has to take care of
the discipline of his own sister's children. Therefore, the school should
send a child's report card to the child's mother and her brothers (the
child's maternal uncles).
Indeed, if such a measure were to be taken by the schools, this would
greatly improve the level of discipline a child receives and would, in
theory, lead to higher results. Maternal uncles were and still are the only
figures that have actual authority over Tutchone youths. Presently, fathers
are imposed by Euro-Canadian law as the main persons responsible for the
care and discipline of a child. This has led and still leads to complete
social anomy.
Liberalism 2 could certainly accept such a change and thus
acknowledge the authority of maternal uncles. Liberalism 2 could even
accept the fact that to honor the rule of matrilineal descent, a child's father
be not officially informed at all of his own children's progress.
Conversely, this father would have to be fully updated as to his sister's
children's achievements.
Obviously, the problem of matrilineal inversions of roles is so
pervasive that it even influences a simple question like where report cards
should be sent. Yet, liberalism 2 can most likely accommodate such needs,
and even pass special laws giving to Tutchone final control over children
only to the mother and her brothers and in no case to the father. From a
fusion of horizons vantage point, it is to be noted that N.A.L. cultures
grant such right only to mother and father and not to the maternal uncles
at all. Yet, this democratic advance on behalf of another people's
definition of the good life would probably corner liberalism 2 into the last
limits of its cultural entrenchment, or so it clearly seems if one reflects on
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the dumbfounded reactions of non-specialists hearing of such a proposal
for the first time.
What of fostering Tutchone polyandrous and polygynous marriages?
I am not asking whether this may rightfully be part of the good life for any
people. Between N.A.L. women and men there would only be a cacophony
of grins and groans. My question is whether the Canadian liberal state
could adopt laws that would allow Tutchone to preserve, reproduce, and
let flourish this aspect of their culture (as we have seen, these plural
relationships are not mere peccadilloes like those of former President
Clinton).
Admittedly, for any government in North and South American migrant
societies to even consider the possibility of accepting polygamous
marriages as legitimate is to open that government up to a barrage of
popular protests. To borrow briefly from "concerned" web sites, the
N.A.L. migrant majority view would be any variant of the following:
(From a man) "I always kinda viewed this practice as a way for dirty old
men to legitimize their lust for young stuff. I'm sure somebody will raise
up the issues of religious freedoms, other cultures, etc., but I'm dead
against it.""
Recent developments in Columbia offer a good example. On July 24,
2001, it adopted a new civil code eliminating jail terms (up to four years)
for bigamists, conceding pardons for former convicts and decriminalizing
the practice. This set off a furor. Womens' rights activists and the Church
protested.2 5 The Colombian bishops said, "This is a green light to infidelity
and promiscuity, and sends a wrong signal about the state's concern for the
stability of the family." 26 Bishop Hector Gutierrez Pavon added: "This
norm is disrespectful to women, who are usually the victims of this
infamy ... " 2 7 Florence Thomas, a well-known feminist leader from Bogota
24. Other interesting comments on the web. From a woman: "I was so appalled that in this
day and age our law enforcers don't do anything to prevent this kind of thing to happen. Mormon
people in Bountiful, BC and also in Colorado City are permitted to have 20 wives, 60 children!!!!!
[sic]. I just can't believe this . .. Anyway, I would like to know how you guys feel about this ...
I really feel for those young girls ... " Quotes from a popular forum on the web (on file with
author). From another man: "The Child Tax Credit issue sure raises my hackles [sic]. In Canada
we're taxed to death anyway and facing cuts left and right and here we are sponsoring people that
abuse the law. As I said before, I am frustrated that polygamists can get away with that ... " Id.
25. Javier Baena, RevisedBigamyLaw UpsetsColombia,ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 12,2001,
available at http://www.polygamyinfo.com/intnalmedia%2Oplyg%2092ap.htm (last visited Oct.
1, 2004).
26. World Watch, Colombia, Bigamy No Longer a Crime, Catholic World Report Aug./Sept.
2001, availableat http://www.catholic.net/RCC/Periodicals/Igpress/2001-09/wcolumbia.html (last
visited Oct. 1, 2004).
27. Id.
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National Universidad agreed: "The bishops are right about the
consequences this will have in Colombian society. This is definitively a
step backward for the cause of women in society." 28
If the Canadian federal government were to consider accepting
polygamous marriages, it would also have to start by re-examining its
criminal code. The relevant article which would need changes is 293.1:
Polygamy - Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any
manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of

polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one
person at the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as
a binding form of marriage; or (b) celebrates, assists or is a party to
a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that purports to sanction a

relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), is guilty of an
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years. 29
Obviously, for Euro-Canadians, polygamy is a very serious crime indeed.

First nation people have been prosecuted and condemned under older
versions of this article. As early as 1899, a Blackfoot married to two
Blackfoot women was convicted of the "crime" of polygamy (yet, as the
court recognized, he was married according to Blackfoot customs).30
Furthermore, would-be immigrants who have already entered into a
polygamous marriage in countries where it is lawful to do so, are outright
denied entry into the country.3 ' Canadian citizens who contract a
polygamous marriage in a country where such a practice is perfectly legal
are also to be prosecuted and sentenced.32
Here, let us underline that the Canadian liberal democracy which would
find it exaggerated to imprison same-clan Tutchone for intermarrying, has
no qualm about giving a person with two spouses a five year jail term.
Why is a jail term in the first case going too far? Why is a jail term in the
second case justifiable? Could it be a question of cultural differences? Yes
indeed, and this reveals how much state laws are also imbedded in rigidly
set cultural norms.
28. Id.
29. CAN. CRIM. CODE art. 293.1.
30. Regina v. Bear's Shin Bone (1899), 3 C.C.C. 329 (also reported: 4 Ten. L. R. 173) NorthWest Territories Supreme Court, Rouleau J., Mar. 9, 1899, available at http://library.
usask.ca/native/cnlc/vo103/513.html (last visited June 28, 2004).
31. Bahig Mohamed Skaik Ali & Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Order delivered
from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, Oct. 29, 1998, available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/
1998/imm-613-97.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
32. CAN. CRIM. CODE art. 290 (1) b.
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Now, given the background of the criminal code, the precedents that
have already been established, the importance of the penalties, N.A.L.
cultures' core morality, N.A.L.C. feminists overwhelming opposition to
polygamy," it is very unlikely that defining plural marriages as fully legal
might be feasible for federally elected officials (even if otherwise welldisposed toward first nations). In the Canadian context, the sole
accommodation which could perhaps be achieved would be to use the
constitutional "notwithstanding clause": i.e. to make the relevant article of
the Criminal Code inapplicable in the case of the Tutchone population or
other similar groups. But even in this case, there would be considerable
opposition to the move - much more so than what is occurring as
monogamous gay marriages are finally being made legal.3 4
Nevertheless, legally speaking, this could still be done, particularly in
a federal state in which differing rights already exist from province to
province." A few liberal 2 type intellectuals might even enlist to support
the project. However, and whatever the case, let us admit this at the outset:
it would be a far cry from Taylor's call for the recognition of the equal
worth of another people's culture. Instead of recognition, it would be more

33. But not so for some. EDWIGE FEUILLERE, LES FEUX DE LA MEMOIRE (Paris: Livre de

Poche, 1978) (the famous French actress writes "every woman should practice polygamy, just like
men ... Why should women not have the right to have one man for the joy given by the body and
another one for the pleasure provided by the mind?").
34. From times immemorial, monogamy seems to have been an ideal among many IndoEuropean peoples. This may explain why in the mind of most people from today's N.A.L. cultures
monogamous gay marriages are more acceptable than heterosexual polygamous marriages.
However, Christians who refuse to allow a homosexual to marry by brandishing the threat that next
will come worse requests such as to legalize polygamous marriages are out of sync: while
homosexual relations, even monogamous ones, seem to be condemned in the Old Testament,
polygamy certainly is not, and not even explicitly so in the New Testament.
35. Differing rights for indigenous people would obviously result in an even more complex
checkerboard state. As Taylor writes: "So members of aboriginal bands will get certain rights and
powers not enjoyed by other Canadians, if the demands for native self-government are finally
agreed on, and certain minorities will get the right to exclude others in order to preserve their
cultural integrity, and so on." See Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM:
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION, supra note 1, at 39-40. Yet, problems stemming from
different national affiliations could be settled like those for people with dual or triple citizenship
between say France, Canada. or the United States (i.e., Euro-Canadian versus Mohawk; EuroCanadian versus Tutchone). For countries where laws are different according to group membership,
geographical areas, segmentation, inequality before the law, see J.A. Laponce, Switzerland: a
Model for Canada? A Model for the EU?, Paper Presented Before the Conference Organized by the
Institute for European Studies ofthe University of British Columbia to Mark the 150th Anniversary
of the Swiss Constitution (Nov. 20, 1991), available at http://www.ies.ubc.ca/events/swiss/
laponce.html (last visited June 28, 2004).
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like a grudging assent to an intrinsic "primitiveness" in Indian cultures, a
"primitiveness" which cannot be eradicated - at least for now. 36
As many liberal 2 scholars would most likely agree to some polygamy
only on this later ground, let us now examine how N.A.L. cultures cope
with the problem of defacto simultaneous plural unions in their midst and
let us consider if N.A.L. cultures' handling of the issue fundamentally
differs from that of cultures that openly acknowledge polygamy as lawful.
This will bring us back to the vantage point of "the fusion of horizons."

V. THE INDIGENCE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CORRECTNESS

To discuss the problem of N.A.L.C. defacto plural unions, I need to
distinguish the situation around 1900 when N.A.L. cultures were strictly
monogamous from the post 1970s period during which many liberal
democracies changed the status of illegitimate children and, as we shall
see, unwittingly compromised the reality of monogamy.
I take France as an example. In that country, illegitimate unions
involved less than ten percent of the population. Of these illegitimate
unions, only a fraction were defacto plural unions - a figure similar to
that of any population, regardless of whether polygamy is permitted or not.
This signifies that even in societies where polygamy is legally accepted,
the vast majority of marriages are monogamous.
To conduct the analysis, I rely on a classical anthropological definition
of marriage offered by Kathleen Gough. 37 This definition, elaborated over
several decades, escapes ethnocentrism in that it takes into account world
variations in the definitions of marriage. Gough's definition states that
"[m]arriage is a relationship established between a woman and one or
more other persons, which provides that a child born to the woman under
circumstances not prohibited by the rules of the relationship, is accorded
36. At any rate, in the case of individuals from N.A.L. cultures, the equal value between
marriage systems allowing polygamy and marriage systems with strict monogamy will always be
denied for the simple reason that against all evidences, such culturally blinded individuals represent
their societies as being strictly monogamous. For Habermas, Taylor's criteria of a presumption of
equal value does not matter. See Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM:
EXAMININGTHE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION, supra note 1, at 129-30, 137-38. Notwithstanding, note
that he would limit minority collective rights to only self-administration, infrastructural benefits,
and subsidies whereas, for him, the right of self-determination seems to include the right of a
majority nation to affirm its identity vis-a-vis immigrants who could give a different cast to the
majority's historically developed political-cultural form of life. He most likely never thought ofthe
implications for the American context of dispersed migrant majorities holding back longestablished indigenous territorial minorities.
37. Kathleen E. Gough, The Nayars and the Definition of Marriage, 89 J. ROYAL
ANTROPOLOGICAL INST. GR. BRIT. & IR. 23-34 (1959).
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full birth-status rights common to normal members of his society or social
stratum."38

The phrasing "between a woman and one of more other persons" is
meant to accommodate the fact that people like the Nuer (East Africa)
allow a childless female to marry a female of child bearing age so that she,
the childless woman, may become a parent through the children of her

wife - children conceived through casual affairs with male lovers. There
is no space here to discuss the implications of each wording, but the key
point of the definition is clear: from an anthropological point of view,
when a woman has a relationship with a person and when the children she
has from or during this relationship are born with full birth-status rights,

the relationship is to be defined as a marriage. Conversely, if the children
are not granted full rights at birth, the relationship is not a marriage and,
indeed, the society indicates its disapproval by imposing a bastard status
to the children born from such illegitimate relations. Last, the definition
does not require that there be right or duties between spouses, for in

various cultures these do not exist and are not necessary to the definition
of marriage.
So what of France and de facto plural unions? Here, reference to the

specific articles in the French civil code and to the jurisprudence will have
to be omitted for lack of space, but they may be found in my earlier study
of the French case titled "Polygamy the French way or the West made
exotic"" and in Alex Weill and Francois Terr64" as well as Berthon and
Hartwig. 4 ' Let me first focus on the case of a married man with a mistress.
Around 1900, children born from a married man and a mistress had no

birth rights. For example, the law prohibited that the child receive the last
name of its male genitor. I use the word genitor, for the latter was never

allowed to legally become the father of his children with his mistress or
mistresses. Moreover, the adulterine bastard child could not inherit from
his genitor and genitor's family members, 42 even when the said genitor or
his family members wrote a will in the child's favor (such dispositions
were considered null and void at the outset). The bastard child could
neither inherit from his genetrix's family members. He could only inherit

from his genetrix (his biological female creator). It was further stipulated
38. Id. at 32.
39. Dominique Legros, Polygamied laFrangaiseou L 'OccidentExotisd, 16 CULTURE 33-53
(1996).
40. wEILL ALEX & FRANCOIS TERRE, DROIT CIVIL: LES PERSONNES, LA FAMILLE, LES
INCAPACITES (1983).

41. Berthon & Hartwig, Les Droits du Couple: Mariage et Union Libre, QUE CHOISIR:
REVUE PUBLIIE PAR L'UNION FEDERALE DES CONSOMMATEURS (France) (1994).

42. Throughout this discussion the use of "he" for a child stands for he/she. No distinction
is made between male and female children.
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that such children could never "enter" into the families of their genetrix
and genitor. What normally would have been their grandparents, uncles
and aunts, cousins, half brothers and sisters, etc. were legal strangers to an

adulterine child. In fact, the law specifically prohibited that he or she
attempt to contact them. If the man divorced his wife and remarried with
his mistress, he still could not recognize his previous children with her as
his. During a Senate debate in 1904, it was stated that to allow a man to

recognize his bastard children after he married their mother would be to
legitimate polygamypost-facto. The case of a married woman with a lover
is more complicated but, from the present vantage point, left the child with
even less rights.
The status of the children of an unmarried man with one or several
mistresses was the same as that of the adulterine bastards except that in
such a case the children could receive the name of their father and inherit
from both father and mother (but absolutely not from their father's and
mother's family members). The children's status from an unmarried
woman with one or several lovers was approximately the same.
Thus, given the 1900 legal context, plural concomitant unions were
then in no way the equivalents of polygamous marriages. For an unmarried
or married man (or woman), the first illegitimate union, the second or the
third, etc., could never be marriages, not even common law, and not even
marriage in the rather ecumenical anthropological sense. As David G.
Maillu, an African social writer from Kenya, puts it, there was then no
choice: "In the Whiteman's world, tradition and law, when a husband
wants a second wife, he divorces his first wife in order to clear the ground
for the second wife. If he wants a third wife, he divorces the second to
make way for the third, and so on."4
Nevertheless, this attachment to strict monogamy had a social cost. As
some legal experts have later commented, around 1900 the Civil Code
made illegitimate children true pariahs of society. Each year, 8.5% of all
French children were born with such a bastard status (obviously not all
from defacto plural unions). The application of this sanction posed in turn
a serious problem of collective morality. Children were paying for the
"immorality" of their parents and, according to some, French culture was
patently immoral in that it destroyed the lives of innocent children for no
fault of their own. With time, these sanctions, and similar ones in Europe,
came to be thought of as untenable, and following England and Germany

who had acted in 1969, France revised its Civil Code in 1972. Further
modifications followed later." What then of illegitimate children and de
facto plural unions nowadays?
43. DAVID G. MAILLU, OUR KIND OF POLYGAMY 29 (1988).

44. Cf Legros, supra note 39.
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Most striking is that the bastard concept or its equivalents are totally
eliminated and that it is clearly specified that a child born out of wedlock
"has, in general, the same rights and the same duties as legitimate children
in his relationships with his father and mother."45 The reservation signaled
by "in general" concerns married men's or married women's children not
born from their respective spouse. This will be discussed below.
The out of wedlock relationship between unmarried persons is
presently called union libre (this is legally different from a common law
marriage in that there are no duties and rights between a woman and a man
in an union libre, just as it is so in some of the world marriage systems
discussed by Kathleen Gough. 46 The child born from a "free union" now
inherits from his parent as if he was a legitimate child. He receives the
name of his genitor. More importantly, the child now "enters" into the
respective families of his mother and father - his aunts are legally his
aunts, his grandparents, his grandparents, etc. If his parents die while he
is still young, he may be taken care of by his adult immediate genealogical
relatives who today not only have rights, but also duties towards him. In
case some estate is to be shared between cousins, he has exactly the same
rights as his cousins born from legal marriages. Finally, as the Code does
not prohibit that a man enters into several free unions at the same time, a
man may very well have several children with full birth-status rights in a
given year from, say, three different women. His female partners may even
legally use his last name as their common name. Yet, their respective
maiden names remain their legal names - but in France the same holds
true for any married women too. For these children from three different
women, he will receive family allowances, young child allowances,
daycare allowances, etc. (and support from numerous other state programs
which represent important amounts of money for a family). The same
applies for a woman living in plural free union. The Code and some
jurisprudence even explain how to assign paternity in case of
disagreements between her and her partners or between her partners
themselves.
Now a conclusion becomes obvious: by eliminating the bastard status
and by making all children equal, France has unwittingly allowed French
citizens to practice a form of polygyny in the case of men and of polyandry
in the case of females. And to pastiche David Maillu, our Kenyan scholar
quoted earlier, today an African polygynous man could very well reply to
his Western critics:

45. FR. C. CIv. new art. 334, 1.
46. Gough, supra note 37.
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Nothing is wrong with us. What my tradition allows me to do is no
different from what a Frenchman is now free to do with several
women. All my children from my different wives are equally mine.
None of them are to be regarded as bastards, just as the
Frenchman's children born from several women at the same time
are legally his. Even his government recognizes that. And his
children are in no way bastards at all. So where is the difference
with us here in Africa?
For the adulterine children born from the extramarital unions of
married men or women, most of the above applies: right to their genitor as
father and to their father's name and full membership in their father's and
mother's family. But there are some differences. The extramarital children
cannot be raised in the married partner's dwelling if the official spouse
objects to it. They inherit only one half of what their legitimate halfsiblings receive. In consequence, even if the children are no more mere
pariahs, they are not accorded complete full birth-status rights common to
normal members of their society. Thus, in this case, we should not speak
of polygamy strictly speaking. However, as it is mainly this form of living
arrangement which is first and foremost decried as polygamy in N.A.L.
cultures, the extramarital relationships could perhaps be regarded as
second order or morganatic marriages (after all the man becomes a full
father of his mistress' children and the married woman can make her lover
the father of her extramarital child while remaining married to her husband
(one case known personally)). If this is accepted, we should then speak in
this case of a form of morganatic polygamous families, a form of
polygamy in which the different spouses and their children do not have
equal rights - this being the full birth-status rights common to normal
members of their social strata.
The fact that the relationships of a married man to his mistress/es or of
a married women to her lover/s may also be regarded as marriages can be
evidenced by looking at the very different way in which the law handles
children born from strictly prohibited incestuous relationships.
Unlike the adulterine child of today, an offspring born from an
incestuous relationship is still systematically denied "full birth-status
rights common to normal members of his society .. ." To do so, the law
states that "If between father and mother there exists an impossibility to
marry because of a blood relationship between them, and that descent has
been established between the child and one of his/her parents, it is
prohibited to further establish descent from the second parent."" Thus,
47. S'il existe entre les pere et mere de 'enfant un des empechements a manage pour cause
de parent6, la filiation 6tant 6tablie a 1'6gard de 'un, it est interdit de I'dtablir a I'6gard de 1'autre.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

17

596

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNA TIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 5

[Vol.

16

today as in the past, a child born from an incestuous relationship may only

have one parent. He remains like the bastard child of yesteryears. The
reason for this is obvious to any legal mind. To let both his genitor and
genetrix recognize descent with him would amount to recognize that

genitor and genetrix, say brother and sister, had been and may still be in
a marital relationship. This is well illustrated by a case adjudicated in the
highest court in France in 2004.
Brigitte and Gilles were born from the same father but from different

mothers.48 In 1990, a child, Marie, was born to them. This child was
legally recognized by both Brigitte and Gilles shortly after birth. However,
as the child was from an incestuous relationship, Gilles' acknowledgement
of paternity (fatherhood) was legally annulled in 1992 by a Tribunal de
Grande Instance. The reason given was that marriage is "prohibited
between a brother and a natural or legitimate sister" and that for this

reason the law also prohibits that the child be recognized by both parents.
In 1998, Gilles found an indirect way to re-establish paternity with his
child. He requested to adopt her. After all, he was the child's maternal
uncle too and nothing in the law prohibited adoption by an uncle. A lower

court refused claiming that while intra-familial adoption is legitimate and
desirable, it would in the case at hand institute "a new relationship
contrary to public order." In 2001, an appellate court upturned the lower
court's decision and allowed Gilles to proceed with the adoption in the
interest of the child. At this point, let us note that the child has above

normal intelligence, knows the conditions of her birth, and supports her
parents. However, the adoption proceeding were suspended for an avocat
gdndralfrom the Courtde Cassassion(somewhat like the Supreme Court)
appealed on the ground that adoption cannot be used as a legal device to
make lawful an illegal relationship. On January 6, 2004, the Cours de
cassassion agreed with the avocat gdndral and denied Gilles the right to
adopt his daughter. He will thus never become her legal father.49

Yet, it is to be noted that other European countries (Germany, Austria, Greece, Switzerland) do not
prohibit full establishment of descent in the case of incestuous relationships. Blandine Grosjean,
Inceste: la JusticeReste Inflexible, la cour de CassationRefuse qu'un HommeAdopte la Fillequ'il
a eue avec sa Demi-Soeur, LIBERATION (Paris), Jan. 7, 2004.
48. I use pseudonyms throughout the story.
49. For further details on this case, see 01-01.600, Arret n* 75 du 6 janvier 2004, Cour de
cassation - Premiere chambre civile, Cassation, Paris, France, available at http://www.
courdecassation.fr/agenda/default.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004); Blandine Grosjean, Un Inceste
Fraternelen Qudte de Paternitd:L 'avocat Generala Demande aux Conseillersde Rappeler que
L'Interdit de L'Inceste est la baseAbsolument Fondamentaledu Droit de la Famille et l 'un des
Piliers de Notre Socidte, LIBERATION (Paris), Dec. 3, 2003; Nathalie Guibert, L 'adoptiond'une
Fillette nee d'un Inceste en Cassation, LE MONDE (Paris), Dec. 4, 2003; Grosjean, supra note 47.
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This much becomes obvious: French courts were not willing to let a
brother and sister relationship be recognized as a. marriage, even if only de
facto. To avoid this, they elected to deny the child born from this union
full birth-status rights - even though, as the intermediate appellate court
admitted, this would have been in the child's best interest. In turn, this
reveals, albeit unintentionally, how crucial children's birth status rights

remain in N.A.L. cultures for granting or denying a relationship the status
of a marriage.

At this juncture, one may ask whether France could eliminate the forms
of polygamy it unwittingly allowed by forbidding plural free unions and
by proscribing extra-marital affairs. Not really, for in the first case it
would have to decide that one free union is legitimate and the others not,
and in the second one, that no extra-marital union whatsoever is legitimate,
even if children are born out of it. This in itself would lead to the

reintroduction of the notion of the illegitimate or bastard child, an immoral
notion that the new Code was meant to forever eradicate.

The British, German, and French shifts about the illegitimacy of
children have been followed by some liberal democracies in South and
North America. What of the new civil code in Columbia for example? To
be sure, the situation varies from country to country and thorough

investigation should be made on a state by state basis. Nevertheless, it may
be said that, in many nation-states, the wall of strict monogamy has now

been cracked (and in some cases, like in Canada, widely breached) for
reasons similar to the one that have affected France. Correlatively, some
migrant majorities in the Americas also allow defacto true polygamy in
one form or another, without having planned it. As details must differ from
nation to nation, it would be an interesting research subject for experts in
family law.

At any rate, the significance of this all too brief exploration into the
world of legal words lies elsewhere. It leads to an inevitable question of
ethic. What right do people in N.A.L. cultures have to claim loud and clear
that polygamy, as it exists among some of their indigenous people, is a

remnant form of "primitiveness," an affront to morality and therefore
unacceptable and not to be tolerated? In turn, this lead to an embarrassing
second question. Should people in N.A.L. cultures return to the infamous
times when, for no fault of their own, hundreds of thousands of their
illegitimate children were treated as true pariahs so that nobody in Western
civilization could be said to practice de facto and, a fortiori, de jure

polygamy?
The dilemma is real. Enforcing strict monogamy is at the cost of

creating a class of citizens born bastards. To de-legitimize the notion of
bastard births is at the cost of making polygamy possible again. If it is so,
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and it is, people in indigenous cultures allowing for some polygamy would
thus not be wrong to treat N.A.L. culture's political correctness as indigent
an ethic as that of the man who shouts to his subalterns: "don't tell me
what I am doing, keep doing what I say."
Now, cynics should attempt to have the last word by raising two
questions which I have so far left aside. If polygamy is being de facto
reinstituted through the eradication of the bastard child status, why should
N.A.L. cultures grant their indigenous people special rights to practice
polygamy? Are not these people also already granted defacto rights to do
so within the terms of the newer family laws of the nation-states in which
they live? These two objections are perfectly valid. But they also have the
merit to force us into a last sobering admission: contemporary N.A.L.
cultures have solved the problem of the bastard child by making him/her
the equal of the legitimate child, yet they still grant thefree union/mother
a less recognized status than that of the legal union/mother; indigenous
family laws do not so discriminate and honor each and every mother with
a full wife status if such is her situation. 50

VI. CONCLUSION

Liberal 1 scholars would probably have preferred it if this Essay had
merely been about an individual right to be polygamous. This would have
made it easy for them to attack it from a moral standpoint and, thus, to
reject offhandedly some of the collective cultural rights of indigenous
people like the Tutchone. But this Essay is not about the individual right
to be polygamous. Indeed, I would be greatly disappointed if anyone had
taken it along such lines. Here, disserting about polygamy is only meant
to give, so to speak, an electroshock with what we "abhor in others" and
yet "must respect," as Charles Taylor should have had it.
Its real question, the deeper one, the only one that truly preoccupies
me, is that of the clash of cultures, and of the arrogance of N.A.L. cultures
when such clashes occur. I have simply chosen some "ugly" legal realities
from among ourselves to illustrate how modest we should be when dealing
with people with divergent cultural traditions. This also illustrates how
questions of democracy and human rights in N.A.L. cultures are in part
embedded in a false image of hyper-modernity that we project upon

50. Incidentally, after the death of huge numbers of young men during World War I, serious
debates in N.A.L. cultures were held about instituting legal polygamy so that widows and other
women could find a fully legal husband and have their own respective families. Cf Miseres et
Tourments de la ChairDurant la Grande Guerre, in LIRE (2002).
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ourselves - or, to return the compliment we make to indigenous people,
in part embedded into our own "primitiveness."
It is true that one finds no direct condemnation of polygamy in U.N.
declarations and conventions while N.A.L. cultures clearly dominate in
U.N. debates. However, could it be that many Muslim member countries
would have opposed any outright criticisms, and that this probably
explains that? Nevertheless, indirect pressures to conform to monogamy
are visibly exerted in this institution by N.A.L. dominant cultures.
The 1948 UniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights skirts the issue while
attempting to address it. For example, it states that: "Men and women of
full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have
the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights
as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.""
But some state may interpret this as meaning "every woman has the
same rights as every woman" and "every man the same as every man."
Which is not the same as what was intended: "every man as the same
rights as every woman." Article 29 (2) specifies that "everyone shall be
subject only to such limitation as are determined by law solely for the
purpose (among other things . . .) of meeting the just requirements of
morality," etc. But once again, it all depends on how morality is locally
defined, especially as far as female citizens are concerned.
The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 goes further.
It specifies that States commit themselves to end discrimination against
women in all forms, including: to incorporate the principle of equality of
men and women in their legal system, abolish all discriminatory laws and
adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination against women. Article
16 (1) adds that: "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality
of men and women: (a) The same right to enter into marriage; etc."
This seems to undermine a Muslim state's claim to rightful polygyny.
And indeed, this may have been one of the reasons for this article. Yet, the
problem of the inequity of men's right to polygyny is also solved, among
other means, from the point of view of gender balanced rights, if women
are equally allowed polyandry (several husbands simultaneously) like they
are de facto in contemporary France as well as elsewhere in N.A.L.
cultures, and de jure in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, parts of India,
Tibet and among some North and South American indigenous people.
51. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art.

16.1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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At this juncture, mention must be made of a final enlightening human
right paradox. The same Convention (Article 16, 1, d.) states that male and

female have: "The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective
of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the
interests of the children shall be paramount."
Primafacie, this sounds fine. However, what of the cultural rights of
matrilineal cultures in which the report cards should go to the mother as
well as to her brother, but not to her husband and the father of her children.
Such a definition of "the good life" never seems to have crossed the minds
of the signatories to the Convention. Deep indigenous cultural differences
were not and still are not part of the dominant states represented at the
United Nations. Thus, what earlier in this Essay seemed an easy

accommodation to make on behalf of indigenous cultures like that of the
Tutchone appears now legally more difficult to put in place than allowing
polygamous practices - no doubt in the case of report cards only because
of a too culturally specific phrasing about parents. Clearly then, the dawn
of a world cultural democracy has not yet arisen.
Can I thus be forgiven if, borrowing freely from Flaubert, I portray

present-day liberal democracy and human rights as mere "broken tin
kettles on which we hammer out tunes to make bears dance, when we long
to move the stars." What a music! What a dance! But let us not be too
ironic. When emergencies arise, we have no other songs to sing! No other
dance to dance! And yet, let us not be too complacent either with "broken
tin kettle music." Instead, "let resound deep thunder, peal on peal, afar.""

52. Lord Byron, Childe Harold'sPilgrimage,canto III, stanza 25 (1818).
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